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Patent systems are often justified by an assumption that innovation 
will be spurred by the prospect of patent protection, leading to the accrual 
of greater societal benefits than would be possible under non-patent 
systems.  However, little empirical evidence exists to support this 
assumption.  One way to test the hypothesis that a patent system promotes 
innovation is to simulate the behavior of inventors and competitors 
experimentally under conditions approximating patent and non-patent 
systems.  Employing a multi-user interactive simulation of patent and non-
patent (commons and open source) systems (―PatentSim‖), this study 
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compares rates of innovation, productivity, and societal utility.  PatentSim 
uses an abstracted and cumulative model of the invention process, a 
database of potential innovations, an interactive interface that allows users 
to invent, patent, or open source these innovations, and a network over 
which users may interact with one another to license, assign, buy, infringe, 
and enforce patents.  Data generated thus far using PatentSim suggest that 
a system combining patent and open source protection for inventions (that 
is, similar to modern patent systems) generates significantly lower rates of 
innovation (p<0.05), productivity (p<0.001), and societal utility (p<0.002) 
than does a commons system.  These data also indicate that there is no 
statistical difference in innovation, productivity, or societal utility between 
a pure patent system and a system combining patent and open source 
protection.  The results of this study are inconsistent with the orthodox 
justification for patent systems.  However, they do accord well with 
evidence from the increasingly important field of user and open 
innovation.  Simulation games of the patent system could even provide a 
more effective means of fulfilling the Constitutional mandate ―to promote 
the Progress of . . . useful Arts‖ than does the orthodox assumption that 
technological innovation can be encouraged through the prospect of patent 
protection. 






Patent systems are usually justified by an assumption that they spur technological 
innovation.  According to this orthodox view, the prospect of patent protection for new 
inventions should lead to higher rates of technological innovation, as well as greater 
attendant benefits to society, than would a commons ―system‖ offering no patent 
protection.  As an incentive to encourage the invention of new technologies, a ―patent 
shall contain . . . a grant . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention 
into the United States.‖3  By conferring on patent owners a limited monopoly right to 
exclude others, a patent system should create incentives for technological innovation 
above and beyond any baseline incentives existing in a commons system.  Specifically, 
prospective inventors should respond to this additional patent incentive by allocating 
correspondingly more time, energy, and other resources to the invention of ―any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.‖4  Lawrence Lessig has summarized the conventional view of 
patents as spurs to technological innovation:  
 
The argument favoring patents is as old as the hills.  If an inventor 
can‘t get a patent, then he will have less incentive to invent.  Without a 
patent, his idea could simply be taken.  If his idea could simply be taken, 
then others could benefit from his invention without the cost.  They could, 
in other words, free-ride off the work of the inventor.  If people could so 
easily free-ride, fewer would be inventors.  And if fewer were inventors, 
then we would have less progress in ―science and useful arts.‖ 
Getting more progress is the constitutional aim of patents. 5 
 
However, despite the economic logic of the conventional view, there exists surprisingly 
little empirical evidence to support the key assumption that patents do actually spur 
technological innovation.6 
Technological innovation has long been positively linked to economic growth. 7  
In addition, research and development investment into technological innovation do tend 
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to generate exceptionally high returns.8  Thus, on the orthodox assumption that patents 
spur technological innovation, a patent system is considered to be a vital tool in economic 
policy, and even the United States Constitution itself grants Congress the power ―To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.‖9  However, as Lessig has 
suggested, ―the question that must always be asked of any patent regime is whether we 
have good reason to believe that patents have that effect.‖ 10 
Previous studies attempting to measure the additional quantum of technological 
innovation spurred by the availability of patent protection have taken two broad 
approaches.  Some have relied upon theoretical economic frameworks. 11  Others have 
employed mathematical models of technological innovation, 12 attempted direct 
measurement of technological innovation in a single economy of interest,13 or compared 
rates of technological innovation among countries offering different levels of patent 
protection.14  The results of some of these studies have appeared to undermine the basic 
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assumption that a patent system does indeed promote technological innovation, 
sometimes even suggesting that patents deter, rather than spur, such innovation.  
One way to test the hypothesis that patent systems promote technological 
innovation is to employ an experimental approach to simulate the behavior of inventors 
and competitors under conditions approximating patent and non-patent systems.  
Employing a multi-user interactive simulation of patent, patent/open source, and 
commons systems (―PatentSim™‖),15 this study compares rates of innovation, 
productivity, and social utility across these three systems.  PatentSim uses an abstracted 
and cumulative model of the invention process, a database of potential innovations, an 
interactive interface that allows users to invent, patent or open source these innovations, 
and a network over which users may interact with one another to license, assign, buy, 
infringe, and enforce patents.   
Simulation games have been used effectively in a wide variety of contexts, from 
war games16 to modeling building fires17 to simulations of collaborative work.18 
However, no study has yet employed interactive simulation games to study the 
relationship between a patent system and technological innovation. 19  Simulation games 
differ from traditional mathematical model-based approaches by allowing multiple users 
to interact dynamically with a mathematical model.  In the case of the patent system, this 
approach has several advantages, including the following:  
 
(1) It involves the participation of actual humans, whose behavior may more 
accurately reflect the behavior of human inventors, patent owners, 
sellers, and infringers than can more static mathematical models; 
                                                                                                                                                 
Econ. 77 (1998) (examining patent protection and innovation in France);; Yi Qian, Do National 
Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment? A Cross-
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(2) One can model behavior of both users familiar with the patent system 
and those ignorant of its architecture and purpose, as well as track how 
users learn how to improve their use of a simulated patent system; 
(3) One can easily strengthen, weaken, turn on, or turn off specific features 
of a patent system, such as licensing, absolute novelty, and enforcement, 
allowing isolation of their influence on simulation outcomes; 
(4) One can track each and every event that occurs during any particular 
simulation, generating a comprehensive data set describing behavior 
both of individual users and of an entire simulated patent system. 
 
Results thus far from data generated using PatentSim are striking.  These results 
indicate that current patent systems (that is, systems combining patent and open source 
protection for inventions) may generate significantly lower rates of innovation (p<0.05), 
productivity (p<0.001), and social utility (p<0.002) than does a commons system. 20  This 
suggests that current patent systems may significantly deter, rather than spur, 
technological innovation compared to a commons system.  
Part II of this article briefly reviews empirical evidence relevant to the role of 
patent systems in promoting technological innovation.  Part III provides an overview of 
previous efforts to simulate patent systems.  Part IV describes the architecture and 
functionality of the PatentSim patent simulation system.  Part V presents the 
experimental methods employed in this study, the data resulting from these experiments, 
and statistical analyses of these data.  Part VI compares the empirical results generated 
using PatentSim with evidence about the role of patents in generating technological 
innovation drawn from the emerging field of user and open innovation. 21  Finally, Part 
VII concludes by considering implications that the results of this study may have for the 
patent system, and outlines future research directions on patent systems and technological 
innovation using the PatentSim simulation game. 
                                                 
20 These data also indicate that there is no statistical difference in innovation, productivity, or 
social utility between a pure patent system and a system combining patent and open source 
protection. 
21 This field is sometimes referred to as ―open innovation.‖  For the purposes of this article, 
the more inclusive phrase ―user and open innovation‖ is employed.  




II. PATENTS AND INNOVATION 
 
Both theoretical and empirical approaches have attempted to test the hypothesis 
that availability of patent protection encourages higher levels of technological innovation 
than would occur in the absence of patent protection.  Although neither approach has 
yielded decisive results thus far, they are reviewed below. 
 
 
A. Theoretical Evidence 
 
Mazzoleni and Nelson have constructed a useful framework for organizing 
theories about the patent system.22  They suggest that the answer to the question, ―What 
are the social benefits and costs of awarding patents for inventions?‖ is not simple or well 
settled, despite what ―[m]any economists and patent lawyers seem to think.‖ 23  They 
propose four broad theories about the purposes served by patents:  
 
The anticipation of patents provides motivation for useful invention: we 
weill [sic] call this the ―invention motivation‖ theory.  
 
Patents induce inventors to ―disclose‖ their inventions when otherwise 
they would rely on secrecy, and in this and other ways facilitate wide 
knowledge about and use of inventions: we will call this the ―invention 
dissemination‖ theory. 
 
Patents on inventions induce the needed investments to develop and 
commercialize them: this we call the ―induce commercialization‖ theory.  
 
Patents enable the orderly exploration of broad prospects: we call this the 
―exploration control‖ theory.24 
 
Mazzoleni and Nelson recognize that these purposes are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive; not only may they overlap, but some versions of these theories may even 
conflict with one another.  The first three theories have a long history, whereas the fourth 
theory is of relatively recent vintage.25  Mazzoleni and Nelson also make the useful 
observation that theories about the costs and benefits of patents are often based on 
assumptions (not always explicit) about certain ―context conditions‖: 
                                                 
22 Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs 
of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031, 1031 (1998). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1033. 
25 Id. 




1. The nature and effectiveness of means other than patents to induce 
invention and related activities.  These ―other means‖ may be as diverse as 
government grants and contracts or strong first mover advantages.  
2. Whether the group of potential inventors is likely to work on diverse 
and non-competing ideas, or whether the group is likely to be focused on a 
single alternative or a set of closely connected ones.  Basically the issue 
here is whether or not more inventing input yields more useful inventing 
output or mainly duplication of effort and waste.  
3. The deterrent effect of the presence of patents on unauthorized use of a 
technology and on the transaction costs involved in licensing an invention.  
4. Whether the multiple steps in the invention, development, and 
commercialization of a new technology tend to proceed efficiently within 
a single organization, or whether efficiency is enhanced if different 
organizations are involved at different stages of the process. 
5. What we will call the topography of technological advance, by which 
we mean the manner in which inventions are linked to each other 
temporally, and as systems in use. 
 
At least some of these conditions are partly endogenous to the 
nature of the patent system.  They are themselves influenced by the 
strength and scope of the patent protection within a field of technology. . . 
. In any case, the implications of the theories are very sensitive to the 
assumed context conditions.26 
 
These authors also admit that different theories will probably apply with more or less 
salience in different domains.  In their formulation, ―[t]he proposition we now want 
strongly to espouse is that the appropriate question about these diverse theories is not 
‗Which theory is the correct one?‘ but rather, ‗Where do the different theories apply?‘‖27  
Empirical data and analyses would be useful for formulating answers to this latter 
question. 
Other theoretical approaches have been taken to analyze the question of what 
effects patents have on promoting or retarding technological innovation.  For example, 
Landes and Posner suggest a comparative theoretical approach that incorporates insights 
from other forms of intellectual property law: ―a more illuminating way of thinking about 
the patent system is as a response to economic problems inherent in trade secrecy and 
market structure.‖28  Much more work will be required before stronger causal links can 




                                                 
26 Id. at 1034. 
27 Id. at 1044. 
28 Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 294. 




B. Empirical Evidence 
 
In 2003, the National Academies29 published a report on the United States patent 
system, entitled ―Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy,‖30 based on one of the most 
comprehensive reviews of the patent system completed to date.  Included in this report 
was a review of the evidence that the patent system stimulates technological innovation.  
Instead of concluding that patents do spur invention, the National Academies made the 
rather different suggestion that ―[t]here are theoretical as well as empirical reasons to 
question whether patent rights advance innovation in a substantial way in most 
industries.‖31  They offered a number of explanations for why patents might not spur 
technological innovation.  For example, the report points out that the benefits of the 
patent monopoly might be outweighed by the costs of disclosure required to receive the 
patent grant,32 and, that, ―where technological advances build upon one another 
cumulatively, as is increasingly the case, broad patent protection on upstream discoveries 
may slow the rate of technical change by impeding subsequent innovations.‖33  Despite 
abundant studies into patents and technological innovation, including theoretical work 
spanning more than a century and ―[e]mpirical work by a number of economists over 
nearly fifty years,‖34 the National Academies concluded that the ―literature on the impact 
of patents on innovation must be considered emergent.‖ 35 
The National Academies determined that there has been ―little systematic 
empirical analysis of the impact of patents on innovation.‖ 36  This lack of empirical 
analysis may stem from two very different problems: the existence of limited data that 
links patents and innovation; and, the fact that ―the effect of patent policy has many 
dimensions,‖ making it challenging to determine how any particular aspect of patent 
policy actually affects innovation.37  Thus, there is a strong need for empirical data and 
                                                 
29 The National Academies ―perform an unparalleled public service by bringing together 
committees of experts in all areas of scientific and technological endeavor.  These experts serve 
pro bono to address critical national issues and give advice to the federal government and the 
public.‖ The National Academies, About, http://www.nationalacademies.org/about (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2008). 
30 Cohen & Merrill, supra note 6. 
31 Cohen & Merrill, supra note 6,at 2. 
32 Id. (citation omitted). 
33 Id. at 3 (citations omitted).  
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 2. 
37 Id. at 3–4. 




analysis to elucidate what role a patent system may play ―[t]o promote the Progress of . . . 
useful Arts.‖38 
In this article, we describe our efforts to provide such empirical data and analyses.  
By gathering empirical data using PatentSim, a dynamic interactive simulation of the 
patent system, we offer a novel approach to test the hypothesis that patents spur 
technological innovation.39   
 
 
III. SIMULATION OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
 
Two major categories of simulations have been used to study intellectual 
property.  The first involves the application of mathematical simulation techniques, most 
often employed in the economic studies of intellectual property. 40  The second makes use 
of human participants, and such simulations are sometimes described as ―games.‖ 41 
 
 
A. Mathematical Simulation 
 
Mathematical simulations, particularly economic simulations, have been used to 
test various hypotheses about intellectual property systems, including patent systems.  
Some mathematical simulations have attempted to estimate the value of patent systems in 
general.  For example, Lanjouw estimated the value to inventors of patent protection in 
different fields of technology.42 Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen analyzed how investments 
in research and development react when the value of patent protection changes. 43  
Mathematical simulations have also been used to simulate how variations in the strength 
of intellectual property protection may affect rates or patterns of technological 
innovation, and, more generally, social welfare.44 
                                                 
38 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
39 PatentSim™ can be found on the Internet at www.patentgame.net. 
40 Mathematical simulations do not involve human participants, relying only on software 
algorithms and specified sets of parameters.  
41 Simulation games also involve algorithms and some specified sets of parameters, but 
additionally include human participants whose behaviors interact with the algorithms and 
parameters.  
42 Jean Olson Lanjouw, Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation 
Estimations of Patent Value, 65 Rev. Econ. Stud. 671, 671 (1998). 
43 Ashish Arora, Marco Ceccagnoli, & Wesley M. Cohen, R&D and the Patent Premium 1 
(Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2003). 
44 See Max Boisot, Ian C. MacMillan, & Kyeong Seok Han, Property Rights and Information 
Flows: A Simulation Approach, 17 J. Evolutionary Econ. 63, 63 (2007) (simulating ―the quantity 
and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes‖); Thomas Vallee & 




Others have used mathematical simulations to study specific aspects of a patent 
system, such as patent terms,45 or to compare effects of patenting in specific industries, 
such as pharmaceuticals.46  Similar approaches have also considered the effects of 
damages in litigation47 or of a post-grant opposition system.48 
 
 
B. Simulation Games 
 
Unlike mathematical simulations, whose results depend entirely on calculations 
made by algorithms, simulation games allow the possibility of more meaningful results 
by including more complicated elements of actual human behavior.  It is reasonable that 
humans may be better at simulating human behavior than are computer algorithms alone.  
Simulation games – especially those carried out using computers - are increasingly 
important in the study of human systems, such as the law. 
As long ago as 1984, Hazen and Hazen discussed ―simulation gaming‖ as a 
valuable teaching tool: 
 
Gaming has been described as a type of simulation involving the use of 
human decision makers in the simulation of a real life situation which 
involves conflicting interests.  In gaming, the players form an integral part 
                                                                                                                                                 
Murat Yildizoglu, Social and Technological Efficiency of Patent Systems abstract (May 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Science and Technology Law Review) (using 
―an evolutionary model of industry dynamics‖); see also Andrew A. Toole & Dirk Czarnitzki, 
Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty, and R&D Investment 2 (Berkeley Ctr. for Law & Tech., 
Working Paper No. 24, 2006) (using Real Options analysis to find that patent protection 
―diminishes the patenting firm‘s sensitivity to market uncertainties and stimulates R&D 
investment‖). 
45 Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND 
J. Econ. 197, 197 (1999). 
46 Carsten Fink, How Stronger Patent Protection in India Might Affect the Behavior or [sic] 
Transnational Pharmaceutical Industries 29 (Dev. Research Group, World Bank, Working Paper 
No. 2352, 2000); see also Jason C. Hsu & Eduardo S. Schwartz, A Model of R&D Valuation and 
the Design of Research Incentives 1 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10041, 
2003) (finding that patent protection will not stimulate R&D in vaccines for diseases affecting 
developing countries); Eduardo S. Schwartz, Patents and R&D as Real Options 2 (Nat‘l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10114, 2003) (using Real Options to assess the value of 
patents in the pharmaceutical industry, though based on a model that has general application, and 
particularly looking at patent duration).  
47 Michael Abramowicz, A Unified Economic Theory of Noninfringement Opinions, 14 Fed. 
Cir. B.J. 241, 243 (2004). 
48 Jonathan Levin & Richard Levin, Benefits and Costs of an Opposition Process, in Patents in 
the Knowledge-Based Economy 120, 123 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 




of the simulation, often filling those roles or elements of the simulations 
that cannot easily be programmed into a simulation model.49 
 
Even earlier, in 1972, John Drobak discussed ―[g]aming as a research device.‖50  He 
observed that ―one of the major problems of computer simulation is the difficulty of 
adequately representing and programming human attributes,‖ and suggested that 
computer gaming, where humans participate in the simulation, could alleviate this 
problem.51  However, he also pointed out that gaming has ―unique limitations in addition 
to those inherent in computer simulation.‖52  For example, individual players might not 
make decisions in the same way institutions would.53 
Simulations of intellectual property processes, whether or not described as games, 
have been used to teach participants about intellectual property and patent systems.  A 
common focus of such simulations has been what strategy businesses might use for 
exploiting their intellectual property.  For example, Arnaud Gasnier has developed 
several variations on games that simulate business usage of patents.54  One version allows 
a team (representing one of several kinds of entities) to choose between several patent 
strategies: research and development, manufacturing, obtaining one‘s own patents, 
exploiting one‘s own patents, defending one‘s own patents, or attacking others‘ patents.55  
A later version of Gasnier‘s simulation game is called Patentopolis.56 
Simulation games have thus far tended to be in the form of board games rather 
than computer- or web-based games.57  Such board games can be designed to provide 
business people or students with hands-on experience in how various strategies succeed 
or fail in practice.  One version, developed by Gasnier, is intended to help businesses 
                                                 
49 Margret M. Hazen & Thomas Lee Hazen, Simulation of Legal Analysis and Instruction on 
the Computer, 59 Ind. L.J. 195, 202 (1984) (citations omitted). 
50 John N. Drobak, Computer Simulation and Gaming: An Interdisciplinary Survey with a 
View Toward Legal Applications, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 712, 719 (1972). 
51 Id. at 719–20. 
52 Id. at 720. 
53 Id. 
54 Arnaud Gasnier, The Patenting Paradox: A Game-based Approach to Patent Management, 
Presentation at Ph.D. Dissertation Defense at Delft University  (Feb. 11, 2008), 
http://www.patenting-paradox.com/Presentation%20080211.pdf. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 16. 
57 See Patentopolis, http://cps.q42.net/projects/10 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 




improve their internal processes for management and decision making about their patent 
portfolios.58 
There have been several other uses of simulation games aimed at helping business 
users understand how to manage and exploit their intellectual property assets.  For 
example, Jerome Haas developed a ―computer-based business simulation that involves an 
ongoing series of strategic decisions related to a hypothetical manufacturing company in 
a competitive environment.‖59  The University of Washington has used a simulation 
game in a continuing education certificate program. 60  The Scandinavian International 
Management Institute has also developed a computer-based simulation game, this one 
related to management practices.61  Some law schools have even used simulation games 
to help teach principles of intellectual property law to law students.62 
This Article presents empirical data generated using PatentSim, – a simulation 
game designed specifically to test hypotheses about patent systems, commons systems, 
and technological innovation. 
 
 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF PATENSIM 
 
PatentSim, a multi-user interactive simulation system, is used to test hypotheses 
of individual and societal benefits by varying incentives for such activities as invention, 
licensing, and infringement by creating a simplified model of the inventive process, and 
networking together multiple users so they can interact through this system.  PatentSim 
uses an abstracted and cumulative model of the innovation process, a database of 
potential innovations, an interactive interface that allows users to invent, patent, or open 
source these innovations, and a network over which users may interact with one another 
to license, assign, buy, infringe, and enforce patents.  Users can potentially cooperate or 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 Cornell Management Game, http://www.cms-training.com/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
60 University of Washington, Certificate Class in Intellectual Property Strategies, 
http://depts.washington.edu/ventures/About_Us/Education/Certificate.php (last visited Dec. 1, 
2008). 
61 Press Release, Scandinavian Int‘l Mgmt. Inst., The Business of Intellectual Property – BIP, 
Program Description 2006 (2006), available at 
http://www.scanbalt.org/graphics/ScanBalt/databases/BIP%202%20page%20version.pdf.  
62 See, e.g., William O. Hennessey, Intellectual Property Program of the Franklin Pierce Law 
Center - Past Developments, Current Situation, and Future Tasks, with particular emphasis on its 
Educational Methodology to Develop Human Resources Meeting Social Needs, ICS Seminar at 
Franklin Pierce Law Center 16 (Feb. 22 2004), available at 
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/pubspapers/hennessey_TOKYOICS.pdf ; University of 
Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, Course Information: Intellectual Property Licensing, 
http://www.law.utah.edu/courseschedule/window_courseInformation.asp?courseID=122 (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2008). 




compete by recombining simpler inventions into more complex and powerful 
combination inventions.  PatentSim is used to test hypotheses regarding the benefits 
conferred on society, in general, and inventors and licensees, in particular, under patent 
and non-patent systems. 
 
 
A. Interface Elements 
 
 
1. Main Interface Screen 
 
There are five main components to the main interface screen of PatentSim, two in 
the left column, two in the center column, and one in the right column (Figure 1).  In the 
top left of the screen, the Score section and the money totals (and, optionally, a timer) for 
each user are displayed.  The timer and money totals dynamically update, so that each 
player knows how long the game has been underway, and how much money the player 
and all other players currently have. 
 
Figure 1.  Main Interface Screen of PatentSim 
 
 
In the bottom left of the main screen is the Innovation section, where players can 
design and manufacture various virtual products.  A product, in the PatentSim system, is 
a combination of one to five Widgets, represented here by the icons featuring the letters 




―A,‖ ―B,‖ ―C,‖ ―D,‖ and ―E.‖63  Each player may drag some or all of the Widgets into a 
―Creation Box‖ at the bottom of this section, arranging them in a specific order.  Once the 
player has arranged the combination of Widgets into a pattern, the player may choose one 
of up to three buttons: ―Make,‖ ―Patent,‖ or ―Open Source.‖  The Make button appears in 
any of the three types of play (―Commons,‖ ―Patent,‖ and ―Patent/Open Source‖).  That 
button takes the player to the Make Product screen, through which a player can be given 
a specified amount of money, to simulate the production and sale of an item on the 
market.  The amount of money that the player will receive varies based on the specific 
combination of Widgets in the box.  However, if a player makes a product for which 
another player owns a corresponding patent, or exclusive license thereto, without 
acquiring the necessary license, that player runs the risk of becoming the subject of a 
patent enforcement action by any other player whose patent rights have been infringed.  
The Patent button appears in ―Patent‖ and ―Patent/Open Source‖ play, and takes the 
player to the Acquire Patent Screen, where the system gives the player the option to 
spend a specified amount of money or time to patent that combination and pattern of 
Widgets.  If the player agrees, the relevant amount of money is deducted from the 
player‘s account (and, optionally, the interface displays a counter and prevents user 
interaction until the specified amount of time has elapsed).  The Open Source button 
appears only in ―Patent/Open Source‖ play, and takes the player to the Set Open Source 
screen, where the player is asked to decide whether or not to designate that combination 
and pattern of Widgets as open source, thus rendering it and all Widgets that contain it as 
henceforth unpatentable and freely usable by other players. 
The center column contains two interface components, both relating to patents 
currently owned by players in the game.  The top component shows a list of all the 
patents held by the player.  Next to each patent is a ―License/Sell‖ button that links to a 
separate web page where the player can specify license and sale parameters (e.g., 
availability, price) for the corresponding patent.  The bottom component shows a list of 
all patents currently owned by other players.  Each of these patents is accompanied by 
buttons that allow a player to license or purchase any of those patents if the patent owner 
has chosen to allow licensing or sale. 
The right column provides a running list of all actions taken by all players.  Each 
action includes the name of the player who took the action, the Widget combination and 
pattern used, and information about whether that combination and pattern was made, 
patented, or open sourced by that player.  In addition, if the action of another player has 
potentially infringed a patent held by the player viewing the screen, an ―Enforce?‖ web 
link appears.  This link takes the player to a screen that provides the player with the 





                                                 
63 Widgets can be any set of symbols.  For example, they could be ―1,‖ ―2,‖ ―3,‖ ―4,‖ and ―5,‖ 
a set of clock gears, a set of shapes, or a set of colors.  In addition, Widgets can be composed of 
2-dimensional strings of characters or symbols or 3-dimensional patterns of characters or 
symbols.  




2. Make Product Screen 
 
This screen informs a player about how much money will be made if the player 
opts to manufacture and sell one unit of the product (i.e., a single combination and pattern 
of Widgets) (Figure 2).  The amount of money the player will earn depends on the 
specified value of the product, as well as on any license fees that the player is legally 
obligated to pay to the owner of a licensed patent.  Each product has a fixed sale value, 
specified at the beginning of the game (see DATABASE section below for the algorithm 
that specifies the price), and which is unknown to the players until they decide to make or 
patent a unit of that product.  The license fees that an individual player will need to pay 
depend on what patent rights (i.e., ownership or license) the player currently owns, and 
what licensing arrangements the player has already negotiated with other players for 
rights to their patents.  Patent owners set license fees in PatentSim, sometimes in 
response to the success of previously set prices.  The simulation contemplates the 
possibility that license fees could be greater than the sale price of the product.  The player 
considering acquiring a license is given the option of proceeding with the licensing 
transaction, or canceling it.  PatentSim allows an iterative negotiating process of offer 
and nonacceptance, eventually leading to an acceptable licensing fee, to occur.  
 










3. Acquire Patent Screen 
 
If a player clicks the Patent button on the main screen, and the product has not yet 
been made, patented, or open sourced (i.e., there is no prior art), the player is given the 
option of patenting that combination and pattern (Figure 3).  The player is informed of 
the sale price of that product, as well as of the legal fee (and, optionally, the time delay 
(i.e., prosecution time)) for acquiring a patent on that particular combination and pattern.  
The player may then choose to proceed with the patenting process, or to cancel and return 
to the main interface screen.  If, however, the product that a player is seeking to patent 
has already been patented, or is currently the subject of a patent application by another 
player, the first player is notified that patenting is not possible. 
 




4. Set Open Source Screen 
 
If a player clicks the Open Source button on the main screen, and there is no prior 
art for that product, the player is given the option of open sourcing it (Figure 4).  The 
player is informed of the sale price of that product.  The player may then choose to 
proceed with the open sourcing process, or cancel and return to the main interface screen.  
If, however, the product that a player is seeking to open source has already been 
protected, or is currently the subject of a patent application or open sourcing process by 




another player, the first player is notified that open sourcing is not possible, and then 
allowed to return to the main game screen. 
 





5. Patent Attributes Screen 
 
Once a player owns a patent, the player can click on the button next to the patent 
and be taken to a screen where rights in the patent may be transferred, either in full or  in 
part, to other players desiring such rights (Figure 5).  Specifically, the patent may be 
made available for sale, or not, and made available for licensing, or not.  If a player 
decides to make the patent available for sale or licensing, the player can specify prices for 


















6. License/Buy/SELL Patent Screens 
 
If a player wishes to license or buy a patent owned by another player, and the 
other player has made that patent available for licensing or sale, the player wishing to 
purchase rights in the patent may click on the License or Buy buttons situated next to the 
patent.  The purchasing player is then taken to a screen where the price for that 
transaction is specified.  The player may either proceed with the transaction, or cancel 
and return to the main interface screen.  The patent owner has the ability to change the 
prices set for licensing or buying the player‘s patent, so there is an opportunity for a form 
of iterative bargaining to reach a mutually agreeable price.  Alternatively, PatentSim can 
allow bids, counterbids, and even dynamic auctions to facilitate the purchase or licensing 
of a patent. 
 
 
7. Enforce/Defend Screens 
 
If a sequence of Widgets for which the player holds a patent is included in a 
product manufactured by another player lacking a license, the patent owner will be 
presented with an Enforce link in the right-hand side list on the main screen (Figure 6).  
The Enforce link appears alongside the report that another player has manufactured and 
sold a product that may infringe the sequence of Widgets protected by one of the patent 




owner‘s patents.  This link takes the patent owner to a page where the amount of legal 
effort to allocate to an enforcement action (represented by a pull-down menu wherein one 
can choose to hire a number of attorneys) can be specified.  Potentially, PatentSim could 
be run whether attorneys are considered a count noun (e.g., hire five attorneys at $5 each) 
or a mass noun (e.g., hire $25 of attorney), with the default set to the count noun 
approach. 
 
Figure 6.  Enforce Patent Screen of PatentSim  
 
 
Once the enforcement effort is specified by the patent owner (plaintiff player), the 
alleged infringer (defendant player) is presented with a similar screen that provides notice 
of the legal action filed against the defendant player as a result of the allegedly infringing 
manufacturing and selling action, and asks the defendant player to allocate effort to the 
legal defense of the infringement action using an equivalent pull-down menu of attorneys 
to that the plaintiff player previously used (Figure 7). 
 
 




Figure 7.  Infringement Defendant Screen of PatentSim 
 
 
8. End Game Screen 
 
Once the game has concluded (see the END OF GAME section below), a final set 
of statistics (including, optionally, a ranked order of players‘ resulting money) is 
displayed.   
 
 
B. Database Elements 
 
 
1. Database Overview 
 
The PatentSim system uses a MySQL database 64 to store the underlying data 
representations for the different games.  The basic structure of a database consists of one 
or more tables, each of which stores groups of similarly-structured information.  Each 
table has one or more columns, each of which stores a particular piece of information in a 
specified format.  A row in a table is made up of a matched set of values for each column.  
Each piece of data at a specific row and column is called a field.  For example, a table of 
―Attorneys‖ might have columns for name, practice area, and salary, and rows for each of 
several different attorneys.  The salary for a particular attorney would be stored in the 
field specified by the salary column and the row for that attorney.   
                                                 
64 MySQL, http://www.mysql.com/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). 






2. Database Tables 
 
This section describes the tables that provide the data storage and manipulation 




Each game has an accompanying entry in the database‘s ―Game‖ table.  This 
entry includes the type of game (e.g., patent system versus non-patent system), the goal-
state (e.g., end at a fixed time, end when a player obtains a specified amount of money), 
the number of Widgets in the game, the cost for acquiring a patent, the cost for hiring a 
attorney, and any other parameters that might be tested among different games.  Each of 
the tables below contains a Game ID column that specifies which game that particular 
row is connected to.  This Game ID provides the connection between the various 








The innovation table contains a column for the sequence of Widgets in that 
innovation, one for the value of that sequence, and a column to store an indication of 
whether a patent application is pending on that particular Widget.  
 
The value of the sequence is determined prior to the beginning of the game by the 
following algorithm: 
 
(1) First, all of the single widgets (e.g., A, B, C . . . ) are randomly 
assigned a value from 0 to 4. 
(2) Then, all of the two digit sequences (e.g., AB, AC, AD, BA, etc.) 
are assigned a value, calculated as the value of the first digit times 
a random number from 0 to 4.  Note that the value of a two-Widget 
sequence is not the product of the first Widget‘s value times the 
second Widget‘s value. 
(3) Thereafter, all of the three digit sequences are given a value that is 
the value of the two-Widget sequence that it starts with times a 
random value from 0 to 4.  Values for the four and five Widget 
sequences are then calculated in an analogous manner.  This 
algorithm causes the value of a single Widget to be from 0 to 4 
with a mean of 2, a two-Widget sequence to be from 0 to 16 with a 
mean of 4, a three-Widget sequence to be from 0 to 64 with a mean 
of 8, a four-Widget sequence to be from 0 to 256 with a mean of 




16, and a five-Widget sequence to be from 0 to 1024 with a mean 
of 32. 
 
This algorithm is used because it creates a set of values in which certain innovations are 
very valuable, but difficult to invent.  In addition, it makes it possible to locate valuable 
innovations if one is willing to go through the rigorous process of testing the single 
Widgets to see which are most valuable, then testing all of the two-Widget sequences that 
start with those Widgets to find any that are of high value, and proceeding up through the 
orders of complexity.  Having a discoverable pattern to the assignment of value (rather 
than, for example, randomly assigning values in the same range to all Widget sequences) 
helps to provide another potentially successful strategy that players may employ.  This 
algorithm is also an attempt to represent the systematic, experimental nature of the 
process of invention. 
Other algorithms can also be used, depending upon which features of patenting 
and the patent system one wishes to emphasize.  PatentSim has the advantage of being 
capable of incorporating features or assumptions of the patent system derived either from 




The patent table includes a player ID to identify and store who owns each patent, 
an innovation ID to specify which innovation each patent relates to, a time of discovery, 
flags for whether each patent is licensable and/or available for sale, and sale and license 
prices set by each patent owner.  By default, patents are not available for licensing or sale 




The license table stores all of the licenses that are purchased throughout each 





The enforcement table stores the identity of any player who has engaged in 
enforcement of patent rights against an alleged infringing player, the allegedly infringing 
player who has defended against the allegation, the number of attorneys for the plaintiff, 
the number of attorneys for the defendant, a flag for whether or not the prevailing party 





Finally, there is an event table that keeps track of every action players take.  
Specifically, it stores the player‘s ID, a timestamp, and a string that records what specific 
action the player took at the timestamped point in time.  This archiving of all events 




allows for the recreation of every element of every game, thereby opening the door for a 
wealth of a posteriori analyses.  Through data-mining, it may be possible to conduct 




C. Example of a PatentSim Game 
 
This section provides a walk-through of the user experience in the PatentSim 
system, in order to provide an overview of, and insight into, the system‘s operation.  
Five players, Alice, Bob, Carol, David, and Eloise, are recruited to play 
PatentSim.  At an appointed time, an administrator sets up the conditions of the game, 
specifying that it will be a Patent type game, last for 25 minutes, and have various other 
characteristics, and each of the five players logs into a web browser, accessing the system 
via its URL.  The players enter a game number into a web form, so that they are all 
connected to the same game instance.  Each player chooses a login name, so that he or 
she is identifiable throughout the game.  Once the players are all waiting in the game‘s 
digital ―lobby,‖ they are informed that they will be playing a simulated business game, 
and that the goal is to make as much money as possible before the game is over.  They 
are told that the game will conclude at a time randomly chosen between 25 and 35 
minutes after they begin.65  Thereafter, they are instructed to begin playing by clicking 
the ―Begin Game‖ button. 
Upon entering the game, all players see the main interface screen.  Alice catches 
on quickly, and starts dragging Widgets into the ―creation box.‖  When she does this, she 
sees the Make and Patent buttons, clicks on Make, and notices that her money begins to 
increase.  The other players see her action appear in the right column, and start to 
experiment with the interface.  Before long, all of the players are making and patenting 
sequences of Widgets. 
Once the players each own a few patents, they begin to sense the complexity of 
the game, and start developing various strategies for increasing their money.  Alice 
decides to make and sell simple Widgets as quickly as possible, opting for the first 
strategy for making money that she has noticed.  Bob notices that Widgets made from 
different sequences are worth differing amounts of money, and so he explores different 
Widgets in search of high value Widgets.  Carol decides to acquire patent protection for 
several Widgets she believes possess important sequences, hoping to make money by 
enforcing those patents against infringers.  David and Eloise take hybrid approaches, 
blending making and selling, patenting, licensing, and enforcement.  
Players begin to develop relationships with other players.  Carol sees that Alice 
rarely pays her license fees and chooses to target her for enforcement actions.  Bob 
watches all the other players‘ actions to see if anyone makes a certain product repeatedly, 
hoping that his scrutiny will thereby reveal additional high money-value combinations.  
Other players form implicit cross-licensing relationships, choosing not to enforce 
                                                 
65 If appropriate, having the game end at exactly minute 25 might prevent players from 
engaging in various ―end game‖ strategies. 




violations against each other.  All players seem more inclined to enforce their patent 
rights against infringers with relatively high amounts of money.  
The end of the game comes suddenly, right at the 25-minute mark.  The various 
players have different amounts of money and different portfolios of patents. 66  These 
data, as well as data recording all other actions that took place in this session of 





The PatentSim system was created using an open source platform for developing 
database-backed web applications called Ruby on Rails.67  This platform enables the 
creation of multi-user interactive systems using standard web browsers as the interface.  
Because it uses the same technologies that are used for e-commerce and social 
networking sites, many of the challenges of networking, synchronization, interface 
design, and other elements are handled using standard protocols.  Players may take 
actions asynchronously from each other, and the MySQL database back-end ensures 
avoidance of conflicts (e.g., two players attempting to patent the same sequence of 
Widgets).68 
 
E. Interactive Simulation 
 
Involving human players in a simulation of the patent system adds tremendous 
complexity to the behavior of the system and the interpretation of that system.  
Alternatively, a simulation system run without human participation (i.e., a mathematical 
simulation) could run many iterations much faster than is possible with human 
involvement.  PatentSim could be run without direct human participation, using 
computational agents to play against each other.  However, one important reason for 
involving people in a patent simulation is that understanding the behavior of people 
interacting with a simulated patent system under different circumstances can enable 
findings based on real human behavior, rather than idealized, hyperrational computational 
systems.  It is hoped that embracing the complexity, variability, rationality, and 
irrationality that humans exhibit may provide novel, and perhaps unpredictable, insights 





                                                 
66 At the end of the game, players could be rewarded, either financially or otherwise, based on 
their performance in the game. 
67 Ruby on Rails, http://www.rubyonrails.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). 
68 Of course, such complications may occur in the real world, and PatentSim™ is capable of 
enabling a variety of complications of interest to occur, if so desired. 




1. Mapping of Real World into Simulation 
 
In order to create a viable interactive simulation that could shed light on the role 
of patent systems in the real world, it is necessary to consider how aspects of the real 
world could be mapped onto structures in the simulation.  This section describes various 
facets of that mapping. 
 
 
2. Individuals and Businesses 
 
A player of PatentSim serves as the simulated equivalent of an individual or 
business in the real world.  Individuals and businesses may pursue identifiable dominant 
strategies regarding innovation, patenting, manufacturing, selling, licensing, and 
enforcement.  Money is a metric by which many individuals, and most businesses, 
measure success.  Both individuals and businesses may own, buy, sell, and license 
patents protecting inventions.  Players serve to represent the various entities that engage 
in businesses involving innovation. 
  
 
3. The Inventive Process 
 
The process of innovation in the real world involves the interaction of numerous 
human motives and actions with numerous aspects of the surrounding physical and social 
environments.  The process of invention itself can be influenced by a number of factors.  
One potential influence involves education and experience, as reflected in the adage 
―chance favors the prepared mind.‖69  Invention can also involve, at least in part, flashes 
of Archimedean ―Eureka!‖ insight, such as Newton‘s serendipitous (and possibly 
apocryphal) collision with an apple.  Expenditure of time, money, and effort are the many 
other potential factors influencing invention.  As Thomas Edison famously said, ―What 
[invention] boils down to is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent 
perspiration.‖70  By allowing the participation of human players, PatentSim attempts to 
probe the effects these human characteristics can have on inventive outcomes.  
The manner in which people manufacture and invent products of value in the 
simulation seeks to involve each of these elements, allowing people to gain experience by 
exploring the values assigned to various sequences, allowing them to experience 
―Eureka!‖ moments of discovering the sequences of valuable Widgets, and enabling them 
to allocate their time, money, and efforts in ways they find most valuable.  Even 
serendipity is possible in PatentSim, because a player is more likely to understand the 
structure of the embedded valuation system for Widgets if the player happens across 
some of the higher-valued sequences (e.g., those based on powers of 2, such as 256, 512, 
                                                 
69 Wikiquote, Louis Pasteur, 
http://en.wikiquote.org/w/index.php?title=Louis_Pasteur&oldid=830712 (Oct. 9, 2008, 15:26 
EST). 
70 James D. Newton, Uncommon Friends 24 (1987). 




and 1024).  By allowing people to discover islands of value in a sparsely populated 
opportunity space, the PatentSim system provides a simplified version of the real world 
process of invention. 
 
 
4. Ways of Doing Business 
 
The digital interface maps onto an individual‘s or business‘s way of doing 
business.  It provides a means for manufacturing, communicating with others, and 
engaging in legal maneuvers, such as licensing, selling, and enforcing.  It also provides 
multiple pathways for success, thereby paralleling the similar availability of multiple 
pathways to success in the real business world, where different entities may pursue their 
goals by following a diversity of strategies. 
The user interface is also the gatekeeper by which PatentSim can control the 
degree of perfect information that is given to players.  For example, it might be relevant 
to have players know approximately, but not exactly, how much money each other player 
has.  Just as there may not be full transparency in the real world of business, it may be 





The PatentSim patent system provides a simplified mapping of a real-world patent 
system.  Its features enable business entities to patent their inventions, to accept money 
for licenses or sales of patents, and to attempt to enforce their patent rights by suing other 
players for infringement. Certainly, PatentSim cannot capture the full complexity of a 
real-world patent system.  Notably, PatentSim has yet to attempt to incorporate principles 
of international patent law or many of the regulatory, legal, or negotiating complexities 
involved in the patent prosecution, licensing, selling, buying, and litigation processes.  
For example, litigation is currently represented by a relatively quick and decisive process 
involving little more than choosing whether or not to enforce one‘s patent rights, and then 
allocating a proxy for legal effort (i.e., hiring a specified number of attorneys) and 
awaiting the roll of the algorithmic dice.  Nevertheless, PatentSim does attempt to capture 
the fundamental and meaningful elements common to most patent systems.  
 
 
6. Encouraging Innovation 
 
The goal of patent systems in the real world is to encourage innovation.  In 
simulation, we can measure various attributes of players‘ behaviors, including the 
number of times a Widget is manufactured, the number of patents acquired, the range of 
sequences manufactured or patented, and all instances of licensing, selling, and 
enforcement.  While these data are based only on discrete and objectively trackable 
events, they may provide insight into the motivations and strategies of producers and 
consumers of innovation, as well as evidence of their responses to variations in incentives 
patent systems provide. 




Since various parameters of PatentSim can be deliberately varied, the simulation 
system can also be used to isolate and change specified parameters in order to map their 
influences on simulation outcomes.  For example, while holding all other variables 
constant, one could run separate trials in PatentSim in each of which the patent term is set 
to a different length, and then compare the effect of different patent terms on simulation 
outcomes.  By conducting such an experiment, one might uncover tipping points at which 
one set of patent strategies begin consistently to outperform other sets of strategies.  Such 
results could then be used to construct hypotheses about the real world patent system and 
be compared to real world empirical data.  Because PatentSim allows finer control than is 
possible in the real world, patterns revealed in the patent simulation have the potential to 
reveal real world patterns obscured by the complexity and roughness of real world data. 
 
 
7. Impediments to Innovation 
 
Numerous forces serve to stifle innovation in the real world.  Notable among 
these are lacunae of money, time, effort, and enthusiasm.  Inventors have been known to 
balk at patenting their work out of sheer dread of interacting with patent attorneys, let 
alone paying their fees.  The PatentSim system cannot capture all of these impediments, 
but it does include financial costs and time delays as impediments to certain activities.  




8. Measuring Social Utility 
 
Usually, the professed ultimate goal of encouraging innovation is to enhance 
social utility or well-being.  PatentSim uses money as a proxy by which to measure these 
variables.  While not a perfect proxy, money is widely used as the default utility proxy.  
Even given an acceptable proxy for utility, measuring the distributive consequences of 
innovation presents a difficult challenge.   Under various versions of Pareto efficiency, a 
positive societal result occurs when (1) society as a whole is better off even though some 
of its constituent members are worse off, (2) society as a whole is better off a nd none of 
its constituent members are worse off, or (3) society and all of its constituent members 
are better off.71  PatentSim allows the comprehensive measurement of utility (as 
represented by money, points, or other currencies) across society as a whole (the 
aggregate of all players‘ utilities) and for each and every constituent member (each 
individual player).  This approach may shed light on the effects that different rates of 
innovation may have on social and individual utility.  
Furthermore, exit surveys can ask players to rate such alternative measurements 
of utility as how they enjoyed playing the simulation, how they valued their interactions 
with other players, or how satisfied they were with the outcome of the simulation.  
 
 
                                                 
71 Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law 46 (2004). 




9. Constraints of Simulation 
 
There are a number of inevitable constraints that accompany the creation of an 
interactive simulation.  One significant constraint is that the simulation must usually 
begin and end at defined points in time.  In the real world, there is often no clear 
beginning or end to the business process.  As Rosencrantz states in Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern are Dead, ―The only beginning is birth and the only end is death-if you 
can‘t count on that, what can you count on?‖72  Individuals and companies tend to enter 
and leave the business world dynamically, their entries and exits are staggered, and the 
resources they have available to them vary over time, are different in kind, and may 
confer competitive advantages unequally.  Thus, among the challenges and questions that 
a simulation game must confront are the following: 
 
Should all the players start and end at the same time? 
Should some players be given directions, while others are left to find their own 
way? 
Should players know ahead of time when, or under what conditions, the game will 
end, or should they be kept ignorant of such details to avoid the use of ―end 
game‖ strategies? 
 
If designed carefully, simulations can provide insight into the workings of the real world, 
but they must attend to these types of issues to enable their results to transfer effectively 
into real-world insights. 
 
 
10.  Long-Term Deployment 
 
An area of potential future work involves the deployment of the PatentSim system 
as a long-term online game that players can dynamically enter and leave.  
Technologically, it would require little additional effort to enable players to add 
themselves to, and remove themselves from, the simulation, and login at various different 
times.  The system is designed to scale readily to large numbers of players.  The 
popularity of massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs), such as World of Warcraft 
(>11 million players),73 suggests that many people are willing to engage with multi -
player online systems over long periods of time.  While user bases of such magnitude are 
difficult to attract, even a few hundred people playing over an extended period of time 
(e.g., a few weeks or months) could provide a wealth of data for understanding the 




                                                 
72 Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz & Guildenstern are Dead 39 (1st ed. 1967). 
73 Press Release, Blizzard Entm‘t, World of Warcraft Surpasses 11 Million Subscr ibers 
Worldwide (Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.blizzard.com/us/press/081028.html.  




V. METHODS, DATA, AND ANALYSIS  
 
 
A. Experimental Methods 
 
The data presented here were generated using individual human players 
(―Subjects‖).  Groups of Subjects competitively played PatentSim74 against one another 
in games whose parameters were strictly controlled (―Trials‖).  A series of Trials were 
conducted under three distinct Treatments:  (1) a Treatment approximating a pure patent 
system (―Pure Patent‖), (2) a Treatment approximating a system allowing both patents 
and open source (―Patent/Open‖), and (3) a Treatment approximating a pure commons 
system (―Pure Commons‖). 
First, approval was obtained for human subjects research from the University of 
Kansas Institutional Research Board (―IRB‖).  In June 2008, volunteer Subjects were 
chosen from among the 2008 ―summer starters‖ class at the University of Kansas School 
of Law.  These Subjects were in their first semester of law school, and none of them had 
previously studied intellectual property or patent law.  All Subjects were paid $10 per 
hour for the time they were involved in this study.75 
All Subjects attended an introductory meeting at which the ―Introductory Statement 
Regarding The Patent Game™‖76 was read to them and then each student signed his or 
her name to indicate that he or she heard and understood the introductory statement. 
All Subjects were then introduced to The Patent Game interface.  Subjects learned 
how to use all of the functions of The Patent Game.  Finally, Subjects played a series of 
practice games  to ensure that they understood how to use the functions of The Patent 
Game.  Subjects were provided with answers to questions about how to use the functions 
of The Patent Game.  In response to inquiries about the purpose of Subjects‘ participation 
in The Patent Game, Subjects were provided with an answer derived from the 
―Introductory Statement Regarding The Patent Game™‖:  ―We are conducting this study 
to better understand the patent system.  The information obtained from this study will 
help us gain a better understanding of the patent system.‖  
Eight Trials were run for each of the Pure Patent, Patent/Open, and Pure 
Commons Treatments; in The Patent Game, these were represented in the Game Type 
function as Patent, Patent/Open Source, or Commons, respectively.  During every Trial 
the following settings were used in The Patent Game:  
 
Use Lesser Included Strings = Yes 
                                                 
74 During the empirical trials, PatentSim was consistently referred to as ―The Patent Game.‖  
The graphical user interface of PatentSim also includes the title ―The Patent Game.‖  PatentSim 
and The Patent Game are synonymous.  
75 The authors plan to extend this initial study by later studying the behavior of other groups of 
players, such as law students who have already formally studied patent law, engineers, business 
managers, scientists, entrepreneurs, politicians, regulators, and venture capitalists, each of which 
groups will vary in sophistication and motivations. 
76 The text of the introductory statement is in appendix A.  




Time Limit = 30 minutes 
Winning Goal = Unlimited 
Patent Cost = $20.00 
Patent Expiration Time = Unlimited 
Lawyer Cost = $20.00 
Number of Elements = 5 Elements 
 
The Use Lesser Included Strings function ensures that patented and open sourced 
inventions are both accounted for, even if the inventions are only a subset of the Subject‘s 
new or sought after claim.  This same function also keeps track of subsets of characters 
that are included in strings of characters that are made, patented, or open sourced.  The 
Number of Elements refers to the maximum number of characters a Subject can use to 
make any particular invention. 
Each Trial involved five Subjects and lasted exactly 30 minutes.  For each 
Treatment different groups of Subjects played in each Trial.  During each Trial, Subjects 
were requested not to speak with one another or to make any other avoidable noises or 
physical gestures.  If a Subject did speak or make any avoidable noise or gesture, that 
Subject was immediately reminded and requested to desist.  Each Subject used a laptop 
computer wirelessly connected to the Internet to play The Patent Game on the 
www.patentgame.net website.  All Subjects were informed ahead of time that the winner 
of each Trial (that is, the Subject who ended that Trial with the most money) would 
receive a prize. 
 
 
B.  Data 
 
Pure Patent Treatment.  The mean number of unique inventions created was 84.2, 
with a variance of 23.0.  The mean number of total inventions created or made was 316.0, 
with a variance of 53.4.  The mean amount of money with which each Subject ended each 
Trial was $7,703, with a variance of $4,650. 
Patent/Open Source Treatment.  The mean number of unique inventions created 
was 76.8, with a variance of 24.5.  The mean number of total inventions created or made 
was 323.0, with a variance of 124.0.  The mean amount of money with which each 
Subject ended each Trial was $10,210, with a variance of $7,994.  
Pure Commons Treatment.   The mean number of unique inventions created was 
103.0, with a variance of 24.3.  The mean number of total inventions created or made was 
659.0, with a variance of 34.5.  The mean amount of money with which each Subject 
ended each Trial was $41,230, with a variance of $18,220.  
 
 
C.  Analysis 
 
Innovation.  The mean number of unique inventions can represent the rate of 
innovation.  Graph 1 illustrates the relative amounts of innovation generated in the Pure 
Patent, Patent/Open Source, and Pure Commons Treatments.  A Student‘s t-test reveals 
that there is no significant difference in innovation (p=0.538) between the Pure Patent 




and Patent/Open Source Treatments, a nearly significant difference in innovation 
(p=0.128) between the Pure Patent and Pure Commons Treatments, and a significant 
difference in innovation (p=0.046) between the Patent/Open Source and Pure Commons 
Treatments. 
 
Graph 1.  Innovation 
 
Productivity.  The mean number of total inventions created or made can represent 
the rate of productivity.  Graph 2 illustrates the relative amounts of productivity 
generated in the Pure Patent, Patent/Open Source, and Pure Commons Treatments.  A 
Student‘s t-test reveals that there is no significant difference in innovation (p=0.886) 
between the Pure Patent and Patent/Open Source Treatments, a highly significant 
difference in productivity (p=0.0000000004) between the Pure Patent and Pure Commons 
Treatments, and a highly significant difference in productivity (p=0.000003) between the 
Patent/Open Source and Pure Commons Treatments.  
 
Graph 2.  Productivity 
 
Social Utility.  The mean amount of money with which each Subject ended each 
Trial can represent wealth or social utility.  Graph 3 illustrates the relative amounts of 
social utility generated in the Pure Patent, Patent/Open Source, and Pure Commons 
Treatments.  A Student‘s t-test reveals that there is no significant difference in social 
utility (p=0.454) between the Pure Patent and Patent/Open Source Treatments, a highly 




significant difference in social utility (p=0.0002) between the Pure Patent and Pure 
Commons Treatments, and a significant difference in social utility (p=0.0006) between 
the Patent/Open Source and Pure Commons Treatments. 
 
Graph 3.  Social Utility 
 
The empirical data generated using The Patent Game suggest that a system 
combining patent and open source protection for inventions (that is, similar to modern 
patent systems) generates significantly lower rates of innovation (p<0.05), productivity 
(p<0.001), and social utility (p<0.002) than does a commons system.  These data also 
indicate that there is no statistical difference in innovation, productivity, or social utility 
between a pure patent system and a system combining patent and open source protection.  
 
 
VI. USER AND OPEN INNOVATION 
 
Empirical data generated using The Patent Game suggest that commons systems 
can generate significantly greater amounts of innovation, productivity, and social utility 
than currently predominating patent systems that combine both patent and open source 
protection for inventions.  These results represent a marked departure from the orthodox 
view that patent systems can be justified because they spur technological innovation.  
However, these same results are consistent with much of the research generated by the 
increasingly important field of user and open innovation. 
As Lawrence Lessig, a prominent advocate of user and open innovation, has 
explained, ―[g]etting more progress is the constitutional aim of patents.‖ 77  However, 
Lessig also points out that ―the question that must always be asked of any patent regime 
is whether we have good reason to believe that patents have that effect.‖ 78  Lessig 
answers this question in the negative, stating that ―[t]he strongest conclusion one can 
                                                 
77 Lessig, supra note 4, at 205. 
78 Id. 




draw is that whatever benefit patents provide (except in industries such as 
pharmaceutics), it is small.‖79 
 
Eric von Hippel, a founder of the field of user and open innovation, has  observed 
that patent systems offer not just benefits to society, but significant costs as well: 
 
The fundamental reason that societies grant intellectual property rights to 
innovators is to increase private investment in innovation.  At the same 
time, economists have long known that there will be social welfare losses 
associated with these grants: owners of intellectual property will generally 
restrict the use of their legally protected information in order to increase 
private profits.  In other words, intellectual property rights are thought to 
be good for innovation and bad for competition.80 
 
As with Lessig, von Hippel is skeptical of the orthodox justification of patent systems, 
observing that ―[s]tudies find that innovators in many fields view patents as having only 
limited value,‖81 ―most innovators do not judge patents to be very effective [in spurring 
innovation], and . . . the availability of patent grant protection does not appear to increase 
innovation investment in most fields.‖82  Furthermore, von Hippel has warned that ―the 
characteristics of present-day intellectual property regimes as actually experienced by 
innovators are far from the [beneficial] expectations of theorists and policy makers.‖83  In 
summarizing the last 40 years of research on ―the real-world value of patent 
protection,‖84 von Hippel concludes that ―with a few exceptions, innovators do not think 
that patents are very useful either for excluding imitators or for capturing royalties in 
most industries.‖85 
Economists Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele have argued that ―there is 
no necessity to marry the incentive to innovate to conferral of monopoly power in 
innovations.‖86  von Hippel has gone even further, suggesting that, though ―[t]he 
                                                 
79 Id. at 206. 
80 Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation 112–13 (2005), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/democ1.htm [hereinafter von Hippel, Democratizing 
Innovation]. 
81 Id. at 10. 
82 Id. at 112. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 84. 
85 Id. 
86 Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights 27 
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6956, 1999), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6956. 




consensus view has long been that the good [of intellectual property protection for 
innovations] outweighs the bad, [s]ome – not all – are beginning to think that intellectual 
property rights are bad for innovation too in many cases.‖87 
A growing body of empirical research appears to support the view that patent 
systems do not necessarily ―promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.‖ 88  As far back as 
1988, von Hippel concluded that ―empirical data seem to suggest that the patent grant has 
little value to innovators in most fields.‖89  More recently, Bessen and Hunt have 
identified empirical evidence that, in the software industry at least, ―on average, as firms‘ 
investments in patent protection go up, their investments in research and development 
actually go down.‖90  In their review of the empirical evidence of free-riding, patents, and 
innovation, Bessen and Meurer conclude that, ―it is not clear that the entry of imitators is 
necessarily detrimental to innovation as in the canonical reward theory model.  If firms 
can obtain some rents even when competing against a limited number of other firms, then 
competition might actually increase innovation.‖ 91 Bessen and Meurer interpret the 
available empirical evidence as ―suggest[ing] that much innovation is not dependent on 
patenting,‖92 and that ―innovators have grown frustrated with the failings of the American 
patent system.‖93  They suggest that ―patents are neither the only nor even the most 
important means of encouraging innovation.  On average, patents make a rather small 
contribution in this regard.‖94  Similarly, in her historical study of nineteenth century 
technological innovation, Moser found that countries that offered patent protection to 
inventions did not have higher rates of innovation than countries that offered no such 
protection.95  Bessen and Meurer conclude that ―[o]ur empirical analysis indicates that 
the patent system provides little innovation incentive to most public firms; these are the 
                                                 
87 Von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation, supra note 80, at 113. 
88 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
89 Eric von Hippel, Sources of Innovation 48–51 (1988), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/sources.htm [hereinafter von Hippel, Sources of Innovation].  
90 von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation, supra note 80, at 114 (citing James E. Bessen & 
Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
Working Paper No. 03-17, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=461701).  
91 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure 89 (2008). 
92 Id. at 90. 
93 Id. at 2. 
94 Id. at 118. 
95 Petra Moser, supra note 12, at 1220. 




firms that perform the lion‘s share of R&D.  So it seems unlikely that patents today are an 
effective policy instrument to encourage innovation overall.‖96 
Heller and Eisenberg have long suggested that too much patenting may result in 
an inefficient ―tragedy of the anticommons.‖97  In some particular instances, Bessen and 
Meurer have found evidence that patents can actually harm innovation.  Notably, they 
interpret the aggregate empirical evidence as ―suggest[ing] that during the late 1990s, 
patents provided a net disincentive to innovation outside the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries.‖98  In general, Bessen and Meurer conclude that ―our evidence implies that 
patents place a drag on innovation.  Without this drag, the rate of innovation and 
technological progress might have been even greater, perhaps much greater.‖99  This is 
consistent with research by Josh Lerner, who, based on a large study of patent reforms in 
sixty countries over a period of a century and a half, observed that strengthening of 
available patent protection tended to yield less patenting of new innovations by domestic 
inventors, a result that may correlate with lowered rates of technological innovation. 100 
Yochai Benkler offers an explanation for why patent protection might yield less, 
rather than more, innovation than commons systems:  ―Increasing patent protection . . . 
increases the costs that current innovators have to pay on existing knowledge more than it 
increases their ability to appropriate the value of their own contributions.‖ 101  He 
elaborates that 
 
in the mainstream analysis, exclusive rights always cause static 
inefficiency – that is, they allow producers to charge positive prices for 
products (information) that have a zero marginal cost.  Exclusive rights 
have a more ambiguous effect dynamically.  They raise the expected 
returns from information production, and thereby are thought to induce 
investment in information production and innovation.  However, they also 
increase the costs of information inputs.  If existing innovations are more 
likely covered by patent, then current producers will more likely have to 
pay for innovations or uses that in the past would have been available 
freely from the public domain.  Whether, overall, any given regulatory 
change that increases the scope of exclusive rights improves or 
                                                 
96 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 91, at 216. 
97 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698–701 (1998).  
98 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 91, at 142. 
99 Id. at 146. 
100 Yochai Benkler, Wealth of Networks 39 (2006), available at 
http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_Wealth_Of_Networks.pdf (citing Josh Lerner, Patent Protection 
and Innovation over 150 Years 2 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8977, 
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=315327).  
101 Id. at 39. 




undermines new innovation therefore depends on whether, given the level 
of appropriability that preceded it, it increased input costs more than or 
less than it increased the prospect of being paid for one‘s outputs. 102 
 
In addition, Benkler suggests that patents may result in a drop in productivity. 103  As an 
alternative to proprietary protection for inventions, Benkler has proposed ―commons-
based strategies‖ to spur innovation in software, agriculture, and drug development. 104 
Research on user and open innovation does not necessarily prove that our data 
generated using PatentSim are accurate or meaningful.105  However, we do consider the 
concordance between the results of our empirical simulation game and the rapidly 






Bessen and Meurer have characterized the Patent Clause 106 as a ―Constitutional 
mandate to ‗promote the Progress of . . . the [sic] Useful Arts.‘‖107  In keeping with this 
mandate, patent systems in the United States and most other countries are often justified 
by an assumption that the prospect of patent protection will spur innovation, leading to 
the accrual of greater societal benefits than would be possible under non-patent systems.  
However, little empirical evidence exists to support this assumption.  One method of 
testing the hypothesis that a patent system promotes innovation is to simulate the 
behavior of inventors and competitors under experimental conditions approximating 
patent and non-patent systems. 
Employing PatentSim, a multi-user interactive simulation of patent and non-
patent (commons and open source) systems, this study compares rates of innovation, 
productivity, and societal utility.  PatentSim uses an abstracted and cumulative model of 
the invention process, a database of potential innovations, an interactive interface that 
allows users to invent, patent, or open source these innovations, and a network over 
which users may interact with one another to license, assign, buy, infringe, and enforce 
patents. 
                                                 
102 Id. at 49. 
103 Id. at 49–50. 
104 Id. at 317–55. 
105 In fact, sources of error could include the failure of PatentSim™ to simulate real legal 
systems accurately, unsound selection of experimental parameters, or poor selection of research 
subjects.  
106 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
107 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 91, at 6–7. 




Data generated thus far using PatentSim suggest that a system combining patent 
and open source protection for inventions (that is, similar to modern patent systems) 
generates significantly lower rates of innovation (p<0.05), productivity (p<0.001), and 
societal utility (p<0.002) than does a commons system.  These results are inconsistent 
with the orthodox justification for patent systems.  However, they do accord well with 
evidence from the increasingly important field of user and open innovation. 
In the future, the authors plan to expand on the results presented in this article, 
using PatentSim to explore how patterns of technological innovation vary based on 
strength, duration, and cost of the patent grant, characteristics of individual users, 
numbers of players, strategies, fields of technology, and iterative trials.  Even though the 
evidence in this study is derived from simulation games, rather than real-world empirical 
evidence, it is strongly suggestive that a patent system may not always maximize 
innovation, productivity, and social utility.  Future studies will also investigate the 
conditions under which a patent system might best provide benefits to individuals, in 
particular, and society, in general.  Otherwise, there is cause for concern that the United 
States patent system may contravene the United States‘ Constitutional mandate ―to 
promote the Progress . . . of useful Arts.‖108 
The simulation game approach employed in this study could even have an 
affirmative and salutary effect by allowing investigation into whether a more dynamic 
patent system, in which the parameters of protection (or lack thereof) could be 
continuously adjusted, might improve social utility more effectively than does the 
current, more static, patent system.  Empirical evidence from simulation games may 
provide a more rational basis for guiding public policy to accomplish the Constitutional 
mandate ―to promote the Progress of . . . useful Art‖ 109 than do artifacts of a centuries-
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APPENDIX A—―INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT REGARDING THE PATENT GAME™‖ 
 
The School of Law at the University of Kansas supports the practice of protection for 
human subjects participating in research.  The following information is provided for you 
to decide whether you wish to participate in the present study.  You should be aware that 
even if you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty. 
 
We are conducting this study to better understand the patent system.  This will entail your 
playing The Patent Game, a videogame that is an online simulation of the patent system.  
The Patent Game™ is expected to take approximately 60 minutes to play.  
 
The Patent Game™ should cause no more discomfort than you would experience in your 
everyday life.  Although participation may not benefit you directly, other than payment of 
$10 per hour for your time, we believe that the information obtained from this study will 
help us gain a better understanding of the patent system.  The researcher may ask for your 
social security number in order to comply with federal and state accounting regulations.  
Your participation is solicited, although strictly voluntary.  Your name will not be 
associated in any way with the research findings.  If you would like additional 
information concerning this study before or after it is completed, please feel free to 
contact us by phone or mail. 
 
Playing The Patent Game™ indicates your willingness to participate in this project and 
that you are at least age eighteen.  If you have any additional questions about your rights 
as a research participant, you may call (785) 864-7429 or write the Human Subjects 
Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, 
Lawrence, Kansas, 66045-7563, email dhann@ku.edu. 
 
